Sotah - Chapter Four

See Hilchot Arachin 8:1, Hilchot Kilayim 2:15, and Hilchot Rotzeach 8:6, where referenceis made to various services performed by the court at that time.

The commentaries note that the court cannot actually compel a woman to drink the bitterwater. All it can do is issue a warning so that she will become forbidden to her husband, asstated in Chapter 1, Halachot 10:11.

I.e., although the court pays attention to this matter in Adar, it is possible for a sotah tobe compelled to drink at any time of the year. See Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 7:11, whichstates that it was customary to have a sotah drink the bitter water during Chol HaMo’edwhen there will be many people visiting the Temple.

See Halachah 7.

The commentaries note that there is no verse in the Torah that uses the wording cited bythe Rambam. There are, however, several from which it could be implied that only one sotah should be compelled to drink at one time.

Her original refusal to drink the waters is interpreted as an admission of guilt thatcannot be retracted.

For every scroll must be written for the sake of the woman who drinks its waters, asstated in Chapter 3, Halachah 8. See also Halachah 11 of this chapter.

The ‘‘ash heap’’ was a place in the Temple Courtyard, east of the altar, where sacrifices that became disqualified were burned. Rashi (Sotah 20a) states that this offering also had to be burned.

She is not compelled to drink them. At the outset, their purpose was to determine whetheror not she was innocent. Through her admission, that determination was made (Rashi,Sotah 20a).

. Although God’s name was blotted out in it, this does not endow it with holiness.

As must all sacrifices.

Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sotah 2:4), the Rambam quotes adifferent proof-text as the source for this concept.

I.e., in that order.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rashi (Sotah 17b) as stating that this means without having the lines of the scroll ruled (sirtut) before it is written.

For a more detailed definition of the term the Rambam uses, see Hilchot Tefillin 1:6.

I.e., a person other than a priest.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah, Gittin 2:3, the Rambam mentions Arabic terms for these words. Rav Kapach explains the meaning as follows: Kumos and kankantum are two similar substances, yellow and green powders, which when mixed with gallnut juice produce a black substance. Others translate kumos as gum or resin and kankantum as vitriol or atramentum sutorum.

See Hilchot Tefillin 1:4, which describes how ink was made.

Sotah 18a states that the decision in this instance resolves around the question of bererah — i.e., the idea that retroactively it can be considered that an activity was performedoriginally with an intent that becomes clarified only afterwards.
There is an unresolved debate among the Sages if the principle of bererah is accepted withregard to questions of Scriptural Law, and therefore, the more stringent approach is taken.In this instance, this implies that God’s name should not be blotted out a second time.
Note the Minchat Chinuch, who asks how this questionable drinking of the water isconsidered sufficient to release a woman from the prohibition she incurred after violatingher husband’s warning and entering into privacy with the man in question. Note also that Halachah 2 states that two sotot should not be forced to drink at the same time.

This is not a continuation of the previous subject, but with an instance in which water was prepared for one sotah.

We do not say that God’s name should not be blotted out a second time because of onewoman.

For at the outset, the woman must drink all the water in which her scroll was blotted out.

Sotah (ibid.) also leaves this as an unresolved question. Since there is no binding decisionthat it is acceptable, the Rambam rules as above, that one may not blot out God’s name insuch a situation.

Since it came from the basin— and was measured in a sacred vessel— it must be usedon the day on which it was taken. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin, ch. 3.

Mentioned in Chapter 3, Halachah 10.

Although in some halachic contexts (see Hilchot Shechitah 14:13) ash is considered tobe dust, in this instance, the phrase ‘‘from the dust that is on the earth of the Tabernacle’’implies a similarity between dust and earth (Sotah 16a).

Our translation follows Sotah 16b. The Meiri states that this refers to rotten wood.

I.e., that it existed there previously (Sotah 15b).

Although this deviates from the order stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 15, Sotah 19astates that this order is also acceptable, after the fact.

See Hilchot Issurei Mizbe’ach 6:5. In such an instance, although the meal has beendesignated for use as a sacrifice, since it has not been placed in a sacred vessel, its actualsubstance has not become consecrated.

With the money received from redeeming the first one.

Since it was placed in a sacred vessel, it became consecrated. Consequently, once itbecame impure it must be burned, as stated in Hilchot Pesulei Hamukdashim 19:1.

The meal offering must be burned, because the offering of a sotah is acceptable only when it is being used to test the fidelity of a woman. Once she has admitted her guilt, that is unnecessary.

See Halachah 4.

In this instance as well, the question of the woman’s fidelity has been clarified.

As stated above, the purpose of the offering is to test the woman’s fidelity and thusallow her to resume relations with her husband. If that objective is no longer relevant, as inthe latter two instances mentioned in the halachah, the offering is not brought.

Many authorities maintain that a printer’s error has crept into the text and the textshould read ‘‘the remainder is eaten.’’ Nevertheless, the majority favor the version statedabove.

As stated in Leviticus 6:15, a meal offering brought by a priest should not be eaten, butinstead burned on the altar.

The meal offerings brought by priests are offered on the altar entirely, without a fistful of meal being separated. For a meal offering brought by a non-priest to be acceptable, by contrast, the fistful of meal must be separated and burned as a distinct entity. See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:12.

The term used by the Rambam (and his source, Sotah 6b) refers to hazamah, when thetestimony of the witnesses is disqualified because others testify that they and the witnesseswere together in another place at the time the witnesses say the act took place. Seemingly,the same law would apply if the witnesses’ testimony was disqualified on other grounds.

It need not be redeemed. The rationale is that it was consecrated based on a falsepremise— that the woman had entered into privacy with the man in question. Wheneveran entity is consecrated on a false premise, the consecration is not binding.

The commentaries have questioned why the Rambam quotes the derivation of thisconcept from the Midrash (Sifre Zuta), instead of citing the Talmud (Keritot 9b), whichcites a different proof-text.

Gilgul Sh’vuah implies that when taking an oath on one claim, a person may be required to include a variety of related claims in that oath. See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:12.

For even if she did engage in relations with another man at that time, she would not beforbidden to her yavam (Hilchot Yibbum 2:20).

Sotah 3a records a difference of opinion regarding this matter between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva states, as the Rambam rules here, that a man is obligated toissue a warning, while Rabbi Yishmael maintains that the matter is optional. Other commentaries note that the first mishnah in the tractate of Sotah appears to indicate thatit is forbidden for a husband to issue a warning. (This concept is derived as follows: The mishnah begins: ‘‘When a man issued a warning....’’ From this wording, our Sages infer thatthe mishnah is speaking after the fact. At the outset, a warning should not be given.)
Significantly, Rabbi Akiva was noted for his love of his fellow man, as he stated: ‘‘‘Loveyour fellow man as yourself,’... this is a great general principle within the Torah.’’ Thisimplies — and so is evident from the continuation of the Rambam’s words — that thewarning is not an instrument of strife, but rather is intended to prompt love and closeness.

For this is likely to cause shame and embarrassment and prevent healthy communic-ation between husband and wife. If, however, a warning that was delivered gently and inprivate is not effective, then the husband should warn his wife in the presence of witnesses.

I.e., giving them gentle warnings, as mentioned in the first clause of this halachah.

One may infer that failing to invest oneself in such scrutiny is sinful.